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Summary findings
Researchers have recently been asking why Asian and  business owners are the least educated ethnic group in
European minorities in Africa seem to be more successful  the sample. Because the size and growth rate of a
in business than are people of indigenous ethnicity.  business also increases with the entrepreneur's  educatioin,
Mengistae draws attention to the significant disparity in  the performance of other businesses would have been
business ownership and performance that seems to exist  even worse if their owners hadn't  been better educated
among African ethnic groups as well.  than the Gurage. Indeed, dropping education variables
After analyzing a random selection of small to  from the size determination equation  drastically reduces
medium-size manufacturers in Ethiopia, he finds that  the estimated advantage of Gurage-run businesses.
establishments owned by an indigenous minority ethnic  This suggests that the observed effect of ethnicity
group, the Gurage, typically perform better than those  could be indicative of intergroup differences in
owned by other (major or minority) groups.  unmeasured ability. More important,  it means that
Other things being equal, Gurage-owned businesses are  whether or not the effect will persist in the long run wil,
normally larger, partly because they are bigger as start-  depend on the trend in interethnic differences in
ups and partly because they grow faster. And yet Gurage  investment in education.
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In many countries in Sub-Saharan  Africa,  the ownership of medium and large- scale
businesses is concentrated  in the hands of members  of foreign  minority ethnic groups: for
example, Indians in Kenya, Europeans  in Zimbabwe, and Europeans  and Arabs in Cote
d'Ivoire.  I Based on an analysis  of cross-country  enterprise survey data, Ramchandran and
Shah (1999) suggest that this is in part because businesses  owned by members of these
groups perform better than those run by indigenous  entrepreneurs.  Controlling for initial
size, age, and industry, Asian or European- owned businesses  grow faster than those run
by blacks. In the case of Zimbabwe, Raturi and Swamy  (1999) show that it is unlikely
that this is because formal credit institutions discriminate  against businesses owned by
blacks, for which they found no evidence. Using data from Kenya and Zimbabwe,
Fafchamps (2000) confirms  this result, but also shows that Asian or European businesses
have better access to trade credit. He interprets this as evidence  that ethnic networking in
contract enforcement  may be the reason why the Asians and the Europeans  are doing
better.2
In this paper I pursue the same theme of ethnicity effects in entrepreneurial  success in
Africa, but with a shift in focus to differences  between indigenous  ethnic groups, and the
role that the distribution of skills or ability might play in generating  the effects. Even in
countries where immigrant  ethnic groups have high profiles in business  ownership,
indigenous  entrepreneurs  own most small businesses  and a significant  share of medium
sized establishments.  More importantly, local entrepreneurs  themselves are not a
homogenous ethnic group. And, as seems to be the case in many other multi-ethnic
societies, some groups are popularly perceived  to do better in business  than others.
Should the perception be correct, then disparity  in business ownership  and performance
among indigenous ethnic groups deserves explanation  no less than does the relative
' A number of studies provide  evidence  for similar disparity  among ethnic groups in the United States,
historically  as well as among contemporary  immigrants.  See, for example, Aldrich  and Waldinger  (1990)
and Fairelie and Meyer (1996).
2 See also Fisman (2000) for similar  results on a larger data set that includes observations  from Tanzania
and Zambia as well.
2entrepreneurial  success of foreign ethnic groups.  Part of this explanation could be
unequal distribution of business skills or ability across ethnic groups  that may be
transient or more or less permanent.
The paper is based on an analysis of data from a business survey in Ethiopia that is very
similar to surveys on which the studies  just cited drew. Ethiopia is a country of extreme
ethnic diversity and, unlike most of the countries covered by the other surveys, does not
have a substantial business community  of foreign  ethnicity. 3 The question  I pose is
whether or not businesses  owned by members of some indigenous  ethnic groups normally
perform better than those of others. If they do, how far can we explain the performance
differential by inter-ethnic differences in skills or ability?
The meaning of 'ethnicity' seems to vary considerably  within and across disciplines, as
does that of 'entrepreneurship'. In this paper I follow Knight's definition of the
entrepreneur as an owner operator of a business  enterprise, combining the functions of
management and risk taking (Knight, 1921).  The analysis is therefore confined to owner-
managed establishments.  I also adopt Yinger's definition  of an ethnic group as a
'segment of a larger society whose  members are distinguished  from others by some
mixture of language, religion, race and ancestral  homeland'. There are scores of groups in
Ethiopia  that satisfy this definition.  Of these the Amhara,  the Gurage, the Oromo and the
Tigrawai are the largest, and have a combined share of more than 75 percent of the
current total population of some 60 million. 4
A look at the distribution of my sample of businesses  suggests  that there are large
disparities in business ownership  between ethnic groups. The rate of business ownership
is far higher for the Gurage than for any other group. The Gurage constitute less than 5
percent of the labor force of the region from which the data were collected, and yet nearly
a third of the businesses  in the sample are Gurage- owned. With a share of 40 percent of
establishments,  the Amhara,  rather than the Gurage, constitute the largest ethnic group of
3 Ethiopia did have a sizeable business community  of European extraction  prior to the military takeover of
1974.
3business owners in the sample. However,  the share of the Amhara in the regional
workforce is of the same order of magnitude.  Consequently,  the rate of business
ownership of the Amhara is far smaller than that of the Gurage as is that of other ethnic
groups.
Do Gurage-run enterprises also perform better than businesses run by members of other
indigenous  ethnic groups?  The answer is yes. Controlling for the date of start-up, the
industry of operation, the time of observation,  the education  and prior industry experience
of the owner and unobserved establishment  effects, a Gurage-run business is, on the
average, 26 percent larger than an Amharic-run  business. It is also 39 percent larger than
a business run by a member of any other ethnic group. Part of this size advantage of
Gurge-owned  businesses  is due to their starting  up bigger. Part is because  they
subsequently  grow faster. The start-up size of the average Gurage-run  business is 25
percent larger than the start-up size of the average  business run by a member of any other
ethnic group. When we control for start-up  size, the average Gurage-run  business has an
annual growth rate advantage  of 5.2 percent over the average Amharic-  run business.  It
also has a growth rate advantage  of 10.1  per cent per annum over the average business
run by a member of other non-Amharic  ethnic groups.
These results are all the more interesting  because Gurage business  owners are also the
least educated ethnic group in the sample.  Not only do they have the lowest average
number of years of schooling,  but a Gurage business  owners is also less likely to have
had formal vocational training than an entrepreneur  of any other ethnic identitiy. At first
sight this would seem to suggest that education  is not a factor in entrepreneurial  success.
However, the evidence is to the contrary: other things being equal, entrepreneurs  with
more years of schooling or some formal vocational  training run larger businesses,  again
partly because they start out bigger, and partly because their businesses  grow
significantly faster 5. Indeed, dropping education  variables from the list of controls
sharply reduces the size advantage  of Gurage-run  businesses.  It also significantly lowers
4 Each of the four groups listed  has a distinctive  native language.
4their advantage in terms of rate of growth. I interpret  this to mean that non-Gurage
businesses  would have been even less successful than Gurage-run  businesses  were their
owners less educated than they actually are.
This in turn suggests  that part of the secret of the relative success of Gurage-run
businesses could be the superiority  of Gurage entrepreneurs as a group in terms of some
unmeasured ability: greater drive or energy,  for example. More importantly, it also
implies that the observed ethnicity effect in entrepreneurial  success need not be
permanent. If the effect of education on business size or growth is monotonic over a
reasonably wide range, then, in the long run, the advantage  of Gurage-run businesses can
be eroded completely if the rate of investment  in education  by other ethnic groups
sufficiently  exceeds that of the Gurage.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 justifies the use of establishment
size and growth as measures  of entrepreneurial  performance  and sets out the econometric
framework of the paper. Section 3 discusses  data and variables. Details of findings are
reported in Section 4. I conclude in section 5.
2. The Determination  of Business Size
A conceptual framework that seems to be well suited  for the analysis  of the role of
ethnicity in entrepreneurial  success is the hypothesis of competitive  selection  in the
dynamics of firms. This is the idea that the evolution of a competitive  industry is driven
by a process of selection  arising from the heterogeneity  of producers, that is, from the
fact that no two producers can have the same  level of output from a given mix of traded
factor inputs. Even under pure competition,  some firms will normally be more productive
than others, either because they are always better managed, or because they are better
endowed with some other source of quasi-rent such as advantageous  location or exclusive
knowledge  of pieces of technical information. The resulting inter-firm differences in unit
costs prompt a process of selection  whereby only producers for which the productivity of
traded factor inputs exceeds a critical threshold enter an industry (Lucas, 1978; Lippman
5 Ramchandran  and Shah (1999) find the same result for a sample of businesses pooled from manufacturing
business surveys for Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe  and Tanzania.
5and Rumelt, 1982) or survive and grow in it (Jovanovic, 1982;  Hopenhayn, 1992).
Selection also means dispersion in the size of survivors  observed at any fixed point in
time, whereby the more productive  businesses  are also bigger either because they started
out bigger or because they have grown faster.
The hypothesis suggests a number of alternative  indicators of the success of a business
firm, namely, productivity,  current size and longevity. Because of lack of data on a
control group of non-survivors,  the last of these cannot  be used in the present analysis. 6
And the measurement  of productivity  with the kind of data analyzed  here requires  the
imposition of rather restrictive  assumptions about the technology of production. 7 More
importantly, the use of productivity  as a measure of entrepreneurial  performance requires
a longer time series of observations  than I actually  have. 8 The indicator  of performance
that I use in the paper is therefore current size, which must be a sufficient statistic for past
realizations of productivity  if the hypothesis does indeed hold.
The question of interest is then whether or not the size of an entrepreneurial  business
depends on the ethnicity of its owner and, assuming it does, the extent to which this is
because of inter-ethnic differences in business skills or ability. Let S,, be the current size
of business i in terms of employment,  assets or turnover, and S,, the size of the same
business at its start-up.  The simplest specification  of the determination  of S,, is one in
which businesses that are identical except for differences in S,o  would grow subject
Gibrat's Law, that is, at the same mean rate a  regardless  of scale at start-up.  In this case
we have S,, = e'S01 iU,,,  where U,, is a random error term the log of which has zero mean.
However, recent empirical studies do not seem  to support  this pattern, the most common
finding being that smaller firms grow faster. Among possible explanations  for this are
dynamic economies of scale and the gradual diffusion  of new techniques of production
6 This means that inter-ethnic  differences in business  performance  as reported later strictly apply to the
more successful segment of entrepreneurs  within each group.
7In  particular it requires the assumption  of a constant-  returns- to scale production function because of the
difficulty of observing capital inputs.
8 What  we need in this case is observation  of the time path of productivity  from start-up  to the present,
rather than data points of the immediate  past.
6(Jovanovic  and Macdonald, 1994). In the context of existing selection  models the
phenomenon arises from inter-firm  productivity  differentials  that are permanent but are
learnt about only through experience  (Jovanovic, 1982),  or, are known and transient but
are competed away only gradually (Hopenhayn,  1992). Yet another model implies that
smaller firms would grow slower as a result of differential  rates of investment in R&D
under monopolistic competition  (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Once initial size is
controlled for the influence  of age on growth is ambiguous  in all of these models.
However, another common finding of most empirical studies is that the age of a firm is a
major influence on its growth performance.  A more general specification  of the size
determination  equation is therefore Si, = ea+[il)A  S,0u;,,  where A.,  is the current age of i,
y is a constants which is unity under Gibrat's Law, less than unity if smaller firms grow
faster and greater than unity if smaller firms grow slower. Since it is possible that the
very differences in productivity  that lead to a size effect in growth also lead to differences
in the expected growth rate of firms of the same  age and the same initial size, an even
more general specification is
InS,, = a,, + f  (Ai,)  + lnSSo + u,  (1)
where u,, = In  U 1,  and the firm and time specific term a,, now replaces a.
Assume further that a, is a linear combination  of a common element ao 0, a time or
business cycle effect a,, an unobservable  and time-invariant  establishment-specific
element a,,  and observable  entrepreneurial  characteristics Zj,, j = 1,..,k. A more
informative version of equation (1) would then be
k
lnSi,  =aO +a,  +a,  +3ajZj 1 + f(Ai,)+ylnS,o  +u,,  (2)
j=1
7Assume finally that start-up size, S,O,  itself is partly determined  by the very sources of
productivity that determine growth and is also log-linear  in those sources so that
lnS,o = AO  + Ai +  A.ZXJJ . We then have
k
lnSi,  =a0 +a,  +a;  +Ea,Z,,  +f(Ajj,)+u,7 . (3)
j=l
where a'  =ao +r,  ai =a  +Ar,y,  and a'  =a  +y  ,
My strategy for testing for ethnicity effects in entrepreneurial  performance  consists in the
inclusion of the ethnicity of business owners  among the Z, 's. The estimation of equation
(3) yields an estimate of the overall (marginal)  effect a,  = a/ +  yA, of Z, on current
business size. We can then estimate equation (2) to see how this overall effect divides
into its two components,  namely, yrJ, which is transmitted through start-up size, and aj
which is the effect on growth of the business  since start-up.  Dividing aj by the age of the
business, A,,,  gives us the effect of Zion the annual average growth  rate of business
i since start-up.  This is of course a random variable.  However, we can obtain an estimate
of its mean by estimating equation (2) with the average annual rate of growth of the
business as the left-hand side variable.  Subtracting  the log of start-up size from (2) and
dividing by the age of the business gives
k
gi,  =(aO  +a,  +ai)lAi,  +  aj (Zi/  A,,) +h(Aj,) +(y-  1)(l*S,O/Ai,)  +u,,
J=1
where, g,, = (lnSi,-lnS,o)/Ai,,  h(Aj,)=f(Ai,)/A,,  and u, =u,, /A,,. Let E(a  /Ai,)/=a4,
E(ak / Aj,) =  alk  k = 0,  t, i  , and E[(y - 1)  / Ai,  ]  =  CA . An estimate of the expected effect,
aA., of Z,  on the average annual growth  rate since start up can then be obtained by
estimating
k
g,,  aO  +  aAi  CA  JIIlnSio  + u*  (4)
J/=1
8Note that the parameter aAJ captures only the direct effect of Z,  on the annual average
growth rate since start-up.  To obtain an estimate of the mean of the overall effect of Zj
on the average annual growth rate we need to estimate
k
gjl  = aAO + aA, + aA, + Ea'  Z  ,i + E[h(A,,)]  + u,  (5)
si=1
where, again on the assumption lnS,o =  AO  + Aj  +  2  Aj  Zj,  we have a40 = aAO + CAA  ,
aA,  =  aA,  + CsA 2 and a,,  =  aAj  +  CA
j - Subtracting  the estimate  aAj  that  we obtain  based
on (4) from the estimate of aAJ  obtained based on (5) gives us an estimate of the effect,
CA
2 ), that Z,  has on g,,  through its influence  on start-up size only. This in turn has two
components:  the effect,  .,, of Z. on start-up size, and the effect, CA},  of start-up size on
gi/ -
The analysis of data reported in Section  4 of the paper is based on the estimation of
equations (2) to (5) by GLS on the following  assumptions:  (a) the establishment  effects,
a,,a,  a,Ai,  and aAi  are all random variables;  (b) the error terms, u, and u, are each
distributed iid with zero mean and independently  of the establishment  effects, the Z, 's
and f (A,,); and (c) f(AJ,) is linear in the log of A,,. I should perhaps wam at this point
against possible confusion of the two equations  with standard  business growth equations
estimated  in, for example,  Evans (1987), Hall (1987) and Dunne and Hughes (1994). In
the estimation of standard establishment  growth equations  growth is observed over the
same time interval. This clearly is not the case here since the initial point in time is the
date of start-up, which normally differs from establishment  to establishment.  While this
would not affect the interpretation  of the coefficients  of initial size or of entrepreneurial
characteristics  in an estimated growth equation, it changes radically  the meaning of the
coefficients of the age variable in the same equation. In standard  growth equations this
coefficient  would rightly be assumed to measure some kind of life cycle effect. In
9contrast, the coefficient of the age variable in equation (4) or equation (5) above mixes up
the same effect with start-up  time effects and is, in this sense, difficult  to interpret.
3. Data and Variables
My data sources are the 1993 and 1995 waves of the Addis Ababa Industrial Enterprises
Survey (AAIES), which covered a random selection  of manufacturing  establishments  in
the Addis Ababa region. With an estimated  population of around 3.5 million, the region
is Ethiopia's commercial  and political center and has significant  presence of almost all
ethnic groups of the country. It accounts for some 80 percent of the country's industrial
output and is regarded as something of a melting  pot in which inter-ethnic  differences
appear to have diminished  in many respects over the last century. The 1993 wave of the
AAIES covered 220 manufacturing  establishments  of which 190 were private sector
establishments.  The sample  frame the survey was the 1993 edition of the official register
of manufacturing establishments  of the then Ministry of Industry. Although  the sample
happens to be concentrated in half a dozen industries,  there was no restriction  on sectors
of industry in its selection.  However, the probability  of selection assigned  to each
establishment on the register was proportional  to the establishment's share in the total
employment of all establishments  on the register. Of the 190 private sector
establishments 152 were revisited by the 1995  wave which also collected data for the
1994 fiscal year. The data that are actually analyzed  here relate to 292 observations  on
1  14 of the owner- manage establishments  covered by the revisit. The other 3  8
establishments  were excluded either because  they were not owner- managed or because
they did not supply information  on an essential variable.  Descriptive statistics of the
variables of interest for this sub-group  of establishments  are given in Table 1.
Although information  is available on the sales and assets of all the 114 establishments,  I
measure current size only by the number of full-time observations  at the end of a fiscal
year. This is partly because appropriate  deflators  for star-up sizes in terms of sales or
assets are not available. Start-up  size is defined as the number  of full-time employees at
the time of the start of operations.  The age of the establishment  is defined  as the number
10of years since its founding. Almost all of the establishments  fall in the small to medium
scale category with a mean employment  size of 16 and a standard  deviation of 21. The
mean age of a business is 14 years with a standard  deviation of 11 years.
Just under a third of owners in the sample had at least one other business in some other
line of activity, mainly in trade. Strictly speaking  the measure of business size that
matters from the point of view of measuring entrepreneurial  success is the size of all
owned businesses. Unfortunately,  I cannot use this measure for lack of data on the
employment size of other businesses.  I am therefore including a dummy  variable on the
ownership of other businesses  among Zj4's  as a second best alternative.  Industry
dummies constitute a second set of controls among the Zj 's. The coefficients  of these are
intended to capture inter-industry  differences in capital intensity in the size equations and
industry effects in the growth equations. These are complemented  by one dummy
variable each for the years 1994  and 1995.  About one-third of businesses  in the sample
are in garments and leather goods production against  one-fifth in textiles, about a quarter
in woodwork or metalwork, and another quarter in what I have grouped as "other
industries".
Also included in the Z, 's are variables relating to three entrepreneurial  characteristics,  of
which one is the ethnicity of the owner. Although there are half a dozen ethnic groups of
business owners in the sample,  just under three quarters  of the businesses  are owned by
two groups, namely, the Amhara and the Gurage. I have included a dummy for each of
these two groups among the Z, 's. The other two entrepreneurial  characteristics  included
are the education of the owner and his or her prior work experience in the current
industry. I measure educational attainment  of a business owner in terms of two variables,
namely, the number of years of schooling and a dummy variable for having had formal
vocational training. The motivation  for the inclusion of these variables among potential
determinants  of business size or growth is the hypothesis  that schooling  or vocational
training adds to the business skills of an entrepreneur.  In existing models of competitive
selection skill differences among  business owners are assumed to be unobservable. If
11such differences do indeed account for any part of observed differentials  in business
performance,  one would expect differences  in observable  sources of skill to matter as
well. On the other hand we should be wary of attributing  performance  differentials  to
differences in unmeasured  entrepreneurial  ability in a setting where the performance  of a
business clearly does not depend  on the training or the experience  of its manager. Among
existing studies, Bates (1990) finds that the probability  of survival  of a small business in
the United States increases  with the level of education  of the business owner while
Ramachandran  and Shah (1999) find business growth  to increase with entrepreneurial
schooling in four African countries.
It is likely that some of the entrepreneurial  skills that determine the performance  of an
establishment are industry specific. I assume that, given the age of the establishment,  the
accumulation of such skills by the owner depends on the length of work experience  he or
she had in the industry prior to setting up or acquiring  the establishment.  It is also
possible that the specific form of this experience  matters. Although I do not have data on
the duration of individual  forms of prior industry experience,  information  is available as
to which of the following forms applied to a business owner: engagement as a family
worker, working as a regular employee,  and being self-employed.  A dummy variable
indicating each of these forms is include among  the Z, 's.  In an analysis of a sample of
Ghanaian logging businesses,  Martin and Page (1983) find the length of prior industry
experience of owners to be a significant  influence  on productivity.  I am not aware of
studies in which the effect of particular  forms of the same experience is assessed.
However, Lenz and Laband  (1990) and Bates (1990) provide indirect evidence on the
role of prior industry experience  as a family worker. The former found that small
businesses  that were inherited  from parents were larger in a US data set when they
controlled for entrepreneurial  education,  business age, and industry. On the other hand,
Bates (1990) found no evidence  that occupational  following  of parents influenced the
probability of survival  of similar businesses.
Between them Amharic and Gurage business owners account for 72 percent of
establishments  in my sample.  Although 43 percent of the sample are run by Amharic
owners, the 29 percent share of Gurage owned businesses  reflects a far higher rate
12business ownership among the Gurage than the Amhara since the Amharic ethnic group
in the region's labor force is about 8 times that of the Gurage. And yet, with an average
6.5 years of schooling against 9.6 years for the Amhara and an overall sample average of
8.6 years, Gurage business owners are the least educated  ethnic group within our sample.
Only 10 percent of Gurage entrepreneurs  also had formal vocational  training against a
corresponding  figure 27 percent for the Amhara  and an overall average of 21 percent.
Turning to prior industry experience,  the mean number of years of Gurage owners is
slightly larger than the overall mean of 8 years. However,  contrary to what their larger
share of business ownership suggests,  the proportion  of Gurage owners who had prior
experience as family workers or as self-employees  is not statistically  different from that
of other groups.
4. Results
Ethnicity Effects and Education  in Business  Size Determination
Notice also in Table 1 that the average current size, the average start-up size, and the
average annual growth rate since start-up are all significantly  larger for Gurage-run
businesses than for those run by members of other ethnic groups. I now turn to the task
of isolating the role of ethnicity in generating  this pattern from the influence of other
factors. I present in Table 2 results of the estimation  of equation (3) under alternative
exclusion  restrictions. As should be expected  older businesses are normally larger
(column 1): other things being equal, an establishment  that has been in business twice as
long as another is, on the average, 25 percent larger. Apart from industry, time of
observation, individual  establishment  effects and the ethnicity of the owner of the
business, the 'other things' include the education  of the owner and his or her experience
13in the current industry prior to the start-up  the business.  A business is larger the greater is
the number of years of schooling  of its owner. It is also larger if the owner had formal
vocational training. For every additional  year of schooling  of the owner, the business is
4.4 percent larger while, controlling  for the age of the business and the number of years
of schooling  of the owner, businesses  run by those with formal vocational  training are 55
percent larger. The number  of years of prior work- experience of the owner in the present
industry is also an important influence.  For every additional year of the same experience,
a business is 2 percent larger. Further, controlling  for the duration of prior industry
experience,  businesses of those for whom the experience involved  self-employment  in the
industry are larger. On the other hand, businesses  run by those who had previously
worked in a family business in the same industry are about 60 percent smaller.
The result that interests  me most in the Table is, however, that the ethnicity of the
business owner is a very strong influence  on the size of the business. Other things being
equal, a Gurage-run business is, on the average, at least 26 percent larger than an
Amharic- run business and 39 percent larger than a business run by an owner from other
ethnic groups. The second most interesting aspect of the result is that the estimates and
standard  errors of the effect of ethnicity on business size are sensitive to the inclusion or
exclusion of variables of the educational status of the owner. On the other hand, estimates
of the effects of education  and prior experience are fairly robust to the inclusion or
otherwise of indicators of ethnicity.  The second of these results is evident from a
comparison of column 1 with column 2. The sensitivity  of estimated  coefficients of
ethnicity dummies to the inclusion  of particular  controls can be assessed  by comparing
column 1 with columns 3 to 5. We see from the third column that the size advantage of
Gurage-run businesses  drops sharply when we exclude educational  variables.
As already noted, the average number of years of schooling  is significantly smaller for
the Gurage than for any other ethnic group of business owners.  The proportion  of
business owners who had been trained in a formal institution of vocational education  is
also significantly smaller for the Gurage. The result  that the size advantage of Gurage-run
businesses  falls drastically  when we fail to control for the education  of the owner can
14therefore only mean that non-Gurage businesses  would have been even less successful
than Gurage-run businesses were it not for the greater schooling  of their owners. This in
turn means that the observed advantage  of Gurage-run  businesses  depends on the trend in
ethnic differences in investmnent  in education,  and need not therefore be permanent.  It
also implies that at least part of the observed ethnicity  effect could be due to advantage
that Gurage owners have over those from other ethnic groups in terms of some
unmeasured ability such as drive or energy.
The Effects of Ethnicity and Education on Start-up Size
The effect of an entrepreneurial  characteristic  on current business size is a combination of
the characteristic's influence  on start-up size and its effect on subsequent growth. In
Table 4, I report results of the estimation of equation (2) with a view to separating these
two components. This I do by including the log of start-up size as a right-hand-side
variable  over and above  those already included in the corresponding  columns of Table 2.
The procedure should filter out effects that are transmitted  through start-up, size thereby
leaving each coefficient as a measure of influence  on growth only. As is to be expected,
differences in start-up size explain a large fraction of variation in current size, the
elasticity of current size with respect to start-up size standing at an average of 0.41
(column 1). More importantly,  the introduction  of start-up size reduces  the magnitude of
the coefficient of entrepreneurial  ethnicity compared  to the corresponding  coefficient in
Table 2. In particular it makes  the size advantage  of Gurgage-run  businesses over
businesses run by other non-Amharic  owners  fall from the figure of 39.2 percent in Table
2 to 28.9 percent. This means that the balance of about 10 percent size advantage is due
to the fact that Gurage-run businesses  star-up bigger. Dividing this figure by the
estimated coefficient of the log of start-up size in the same equation suggests that the
start-up size of Gurage-owned  businesses is about 25 percent greater than the start-up
size of the average business owned by an entrepreneurs  from the other ethnic groups.
The inclusion of start-up size also significantly  reduces the marginal  effect of years of
schooling of the business owner on current size. This again suggests  that the reason that
15those with more schooling end up running larger businesses is partly because they start-
up bigger and partly because their businesses  grow faster post-start  up. However,
somewhat surprisingly,  the effect of vocational  training on current size does not change
with the inclusion of start-up size in the equation. In other words, businesses  run by the
vocationally trained are on the average larger, not because they start-up larger, but
because they grow faster.  Notice finally that the inclusion  of start-up  size sharply reduces
the size disadvantage  of businesses  run by those who had previously  been engaged in a
family business in the same industry. This is largely because they start-up smaller: other
things being equal, the start-up  sizes of businesses  run by those had worked in a family
businesses are almost half of the start-up sizes of other businesses  (Tables 2 and 3).
The coefficients of the ethnicity dummies in Table 3 measure the effect of the ethnicity of
the business owner on the growth of the business  since start-up.  Like the overall effect of
ethnicity on current size, these effects are sensitive  to the inclusion of education variables
in the size equation. As can be seen in columns 1 and 3 of the table the omission of the
same variables drastically reduces  ethnicity effects in growth. On the other hand we see
from a comparison  of column 1 with column 2 of the same table, that the effects of the
business owner's schooling  and vocational  training on business growth are fairly robust
to the inclusion or otherwise  of ethnicity dummies among the controls.
The Effects of Ethnicity and Education on Average  Annual Growth Rates
In Tables 4 and 5 I report results of the estimation of equations 5 and 4 respectively.
Table 4 translates the results of Table 2 on the determination  of current  business size into
statements  about the annual growth rate the establishment  since  its founding. Table 5 is a
similar recasting of the results of Table 3. Focusing on Table 5 first, the 39 percent size
advantage of Gurage-run  businesses  over businesses  run by other non-Amharic  business
owners  that we read in the first column of Table 2 translates to a 7 percent advantage  in
the average annual growth rate since start-up  (column 1). Likewise the 26 percent size
advantage  of Gurage businesses  over Amharic  businesses  translates to a minimum of 5
percent advantage  in the annual average growth  rate. The 4.4 percent size advantage  of an
16additional year of schooling  of the business owner now means a 0.5 percent advantage in
the annual average growth rate since start-up.  The 55 percent size advantage  of
businesses  run by the vocationally  trained translates to a growth- rate advantage of 7
percent.
Like ethnicity effects in business size, ethnicity effects in rate of growth are sensitive to
whether or not we control for the education of the owner. And similar to what happens as
we move from the first column of Table 2 to the second column, the omission of
education variables in Table 4 (columns 2 and 3) reduces the growth  rate advantage  of
Gurage-run  businesses. On the other hand, parallel to what we have seen in Table 2, the
estimated effect of the schooling  or vocational  training of the business owner does not
seem to vary much as we omit or add ethnicity  dummies in the growth equation (column
5).
Just as the specifications  of Table 2 lump  the effect that a variable has on current size
through its influence on start-up size with its impact on the rate of growth since start-up,
the effects of a variable on the annual growth rate that we read from Table 4 combines
direct effects with effects transmitted  through start-up size. Including start-up size among
the right hand side variables, as is done in Table 5, enables us to pick out the direct
effects. Unlike the influence  of start-up size on current size, however, the influence of
start-up size on the growth rate is negative.  9 Consequently,  the direct effect of a variable
on the average annual growth  rate exceeds its overall effect if the variable  increases both
start-up size and the rate of growth. This is what we see when we compare the first
column of Table 5 with the first column of Table 4. Thus we see that the growth rate
advantage of Gurage run businesses over businesses  run by members of other non-
Amharic ethnic groups rises from 7.2 percent in Table 4 to 10.1  percent as we move to
Table 5. Similarly,  the growth rate advantage  of Gurage businesses over Amharic
businesses  rises from 5 percent in Table 5 to 7 percent in Table 5.
Like ethnicity, the number of years of schooling  of the business owner influences both
start-up size and growth since start-up.  Its overall marginal effect on the annual growth
rate as read from Table 4 is therefore smaller than the direct effect read from column I of
9  On the average,  businesses that start-up  bigger do end-up bigger in the data, but this is in spite of the fact
that they also grow slower.
17Table 5. On the other hand, because vocational  training of the owner is not correlated
with start-up size, its overall effect on the average annual growth rate is the same as the
direct effect. Once again dropping the same education  variables reduces ethnicity effects
while the effect of education itself is robust to the inclusion  or otherwise  of ethnicity
dummies in the growth rate equation.
5. Summary and Conclusion
This paper has sought to draw attention to the disparity that seems to exist among
indigenous  ethnic groups in Africa in business  ownership rates and performance.
Recently  researchers have been asking why Asian or European ethnic minorities  in the
region are apparently more successful as entrepreneurs  than African ethnic groups. Our
understanding  of the reasons for this phenomenon  could be incomplete if we cannot
explain also why some indigenous  groups do better than others if African ethnic groups
themselves do in fact differ in entrepreneurial  performance.
Based on an analysis of data from a recent survey of owner-managed  manufacturing
businesses  in Ethiopia,  I find that an indigenous  minority group, namely, the Gurage,
happens to have a far higher rate of business ownership  than other major ethnic groups as
well as minorities. This seems to be the case partly because Gurage run businesses
perform better. Controlling for the date of start-up,  the time of observation,  industry of
activity, the education  and prior industry of experience  of the business  owner, and
unobservable  establishment  effects, the average Gurage-owned  establishment  is
significantly  larger. This is in part because the Gurage start-out bigger. It is partly
because Gurage-run businesses  also grow faster.
However, the Gurage are also the least educated  group of business owners in my sample.
They have a lower average of years of schooling  than any other group, and a Gurage
business owner is less likely to have had formal vocational  training. At the same time the
size of a business and its growth rate increase with the two education  variables. The
performance  of other businesses  relative to those run by the Gurage  would therefore have
18been worse than what is reported here had the average level of education  of their owners
been lower than it actually  is compared to that of Gurage owners. This in turn has two
implications. One is that the reported ethnicity effects could partly reflect inter-ethnic
differences in some ability that is not observable  to researchers. The second is that the
effects need not be permanent. Whether or not they will persist in the long-run will
depend on the trend in the rate of investment  in education  of other ethnic groups relative
to that of the Gurage.
It is important to bear in mind that the data analyzed  here have two major limitations
from the point of view of the issue at hand. One is that they do not include information  on
failed businesses. The second is that the sample is drawn entirely from manufacturing
industries to the exclusion of businesses in services or in construction.  It is possible that
failure rates are higher among Gurage-run  manufacturing  businesses  just as it is possible
that the Gurage are doing worse than members of other ethnic groups outside of the
manufacturing sector. If either of these possibilities  is in fact true, my conclusion that
Gurage entrepreneurs are on the average more successful  than others would not
necessarily be true. Neither possibility can be ruled out in the absence of better data,
which in effect means longitudinal  observations  from industrial censuses rather than
sector-specific  sample surveys. However, existing  studies of establishment  survival and
growth in developed economies show that the first of these possibilities is highly
unlikely. A pattern that seems to emerge from findings of these studies is that a variable
that is positively correlated with the size of a business is also positively associated with
the probability of survival of the business.' 0 Thus, if establishments  of the better educated
happen to be larger among survivors,  it is highly unlikely that business failure rates
increase with entrepreneurial  education. Casual observation  suggests  that the second
possibility is not likely either: if anything,  the advantage  of the Gurage in business
ownership rates seems to be more pronounced  in trade or services.
1O  In all theoretical and empirical studies  I know of covariates  of size coincide with those of the probability
of survival. There are quite a few studies  here but see, for example, Dunne and Hughes (1994) and Evans
(1987), where the key exogenous  variables are business  age and initial size. Estimation results of both
studies show that the probability  of survival increases  with initial size and with age just as does current
size. In Holtz-Eakin  et al (1994)  the same set of entrepreneurial  characteristics  determine the probability of
19References
Aldrich, H.E. and Waldinger,  R. 1990. 'Ethnicity and Entrepreneurship.'  Annual Review
of Sociology. 16: 111-135.
Bates, T. 1990. 'Entrepreneur  Human Capital Inputs and Small Business  Longevity.'
Review of Economics  and Statistics 72: 551-559.
Dunne, P. and Hughes, A. 1994. ' Age,  Size , Growth and Survival : UK Companies  in
the 1980s.' Journal of Industrial Economics  42: 115-140.
Evans, D. 1987. 'Tests of Alternative Theories of Firm Growth.' Journal of Political
Economy 95: 657-674.
Fafchamps, M. 2000. 'Ethnicity and Credit in African  Manufacturing.'  Journal of
Development Economics 61: 205-235.
Fairlie, R. and Meyer, B.1996. 'Ethnic and Racial Self-employment  Differences and
Possible Explanations.' Journal of Human Resources 21: 485-506.
Fisman, R. 2000. 'Ethnic Enclaves and Communal Enforcement:  Evidence from Trade
Credit Relationships.' Mimeo, Columbia University.
Hall, B. 1987. The Relationship  between Firm Size and Firm Growth  in the US
Manufacturing Sector.' Journal of Industrial  Economics 35: 583-606.
Holtz-Eakin, D., D. Joulfaian  and H. Rosen. 1994. 'Sticking it Out: Entrepreneurial
Survival and Liquidity Constraints.' Journal of Political Economy 102: 53-75.
Hopenhayn, H., 1992a. 'Entry, Exit, and Firm Dynamics  in Long Run Equilibrium.'
Econometrica, 60: 1127-1150.
Jovanovic,  B., 1982. 'Selection and the Evolution of Industry.' Econometrica  50: 649-
670.
Jovanovic,  B. and G. MacDonald.  1994. 'Competitive  Diffusion.' Journal of Political
Economy 102: 24-52.
Knight, F. H. 1921. Risk, Uncertainty  and Profit. New York: Houghton Mifflin
Company.
Lentz B. and Laband, D. 1990. 'Entrepreneurial  Success and Occupational  Inheritance
Among Proprietors.' Canadian  Journal of Economics  23: 563-578.
survival and size conditional on survival the sign of the marginal  effect of a covariate of the probability of
survival being the same as that of the effect of the same covariate  on current size.
20Lippman, S. and Rumelt, R. 1982. 'Uncertain Immitability: Analysis of Inter-firn
Differences in Efficiency Under Competetion.'  Bell Journal of Economics 13: 418-438.
Lucas, R.E., Jr. 1978. 'On the Size Distribution  of Business Firms.' Bell Journal of
Economics 9: 508-523.
Martin, J. and Page, J. 1983. 'The Impact of Subsidies  on X-efficiency  in LDC Industry:
Theory and Empirical Test.' The Review of Economics  and Statistics 65: 608- 61.
Nelson, R. and Winter, S. 1978. 'Forces Generating  and Limiting Concentration  Under
Schumpeterian  Competetion.' Bell Journal of Economics 9:524-548.
Ramachandran,  V. and Shah, M. 1999. 'Minority Entrepreneurs  and Firm Performance in
Sub-Saharan Africa.' Journal of Development  Studies 36: 71-87.
Raturi, M. and Swamy, A. 1999. 'Explaining Ethnic Differentials  in Credit Market
Outcomes  in Zimbabwe.' Economic  Development  and Cultural Change, pp. 5  86-604.
Yinger, J.M. 1985. 'Ethnicity'. Annual Review  ofSociology 11:151-180
21Table  1: Descriptive  Statistics
(Standard  deviation  in brackets)
Variables  All  Amharic-run  Gurage-  run  Other




of business  owner:
owns  some  other
establishment  (s)  0.29  0.31  0.35  0.26
years  of schooling  8.59  9.59  6.52  9.43
[4.69]  [4.54]  [4.51]  [4.50]
Had  formal  vocational  training  0.21  0.27  0.10  0.25
Prior industry experience:
number  of  years  8.12  8.51  8.59  7.98
[9.35]  [10.07]  [9.75]  [9.15]
worked  in  a family  business  0.19  0.27  0.16  0.20
worked  as  an employee  0.54  0.55  0.64  0.51
was self-employed  0.11  0.13  0.12  0.11
Industry  groups:
garment  or leather  goods  0.32  0.24  0.56  0.23
wood  or metal  work  0.24  0.27  0.09  0.30
textiles  0.19  0.20  0.17  0.21
other  0.25  0.29  0.19  0.27
Other  establishment
characteristics:
number  of  full time  employees  15.97  13.46  19.93  13.64
log  (number  of  full-time
employees)  2.22  2.09  2.42  2.11
[1.03]  [0.98]  [1.031  [0.99]
age  of establishment  14.15  13.17  15.29  13.46
log  (age  of establishment)  2.28  2.16  2.36  2.22
[0.96]  [0.98]  [0.97]  [0.96]
Number  of full-time  employees  6.13  4.89  6.93  5.65
at  start  up
log  (number  of full-time  employ-
ees at start-up)  1.60  1.43  1.75  1.52
[0.85]  [0.82]  [0.82]  [0.86]
average  annual  growth  rate  since
start-up  0.054  0.047  0.088  0.037
[0.135]  [0.119]  [0.138]  10.131]
Year  of observation:
1995  0.37  0.39  0.35  0.39
1994  0.40  0.39  0.35  0.39
Number  of observations  296  121  93  82
22Table  2: GLS Estimation  Results  of Equation  (3)*
Dependent  variable=  log  of  number  of  full-time  employees.
Variables  Specification
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
log  of  age  of  establishment  0.260  0.261  0.201  0.239  0.201
(3.62)  (3.61)  (2.73)  (3.31)  (2.76)
owns  some  other  establishment(s)  0.114  0.126  0.012  0.044  -0.013
(0.66)  (0.71)  (0.06)  (0.25)  (0.07)
Year  of  observation:
1995  -0.161  -0.161  -0.143  -0.119  -0.110
(2.83)  (2.89)  (2.53)  (2.28)  (2.12)
1994  -0.157  -0.157  -0.148  -0.118  -0.115
(2.95)  (3.01)  (2.81)  (2.46)  (2.41)
Ethnic  group:
amhara  0.134  0.113  0.087  0.086
(0.96)  (0.79)  (0.63)  (0.61)
gurage  0.392  0.212  0.339  0.220
(2.10)  (1.09)  (1.76)  (1.13)
Education:
years  of schooling  0.044  0.034  0.027
(2.39)  (1.86)  (1.44)
Had  formal  vocational  training  0.553  0.554  0.464
(2.82)  (2.74)  (2.31)
Prior  Industry  experience:
Number  of  years  0.018  0.017  0.009
(1.98)  (1.83)  (0.92)
worked  in  a family  business  -0.622  -0.595  -0.407
(2.75)  (2.59)  (1.70)
worked  as  an employee  -0.007  0.027  -0.023
(0.04)  (0.15)  (0.12)
was  self-employed  0.133  0.133  0.128
(1.44)  (1.45)  (1.39)
Industry  group:
garment  or leather  goods  -0.501  -0.440  -0.689  -0.481  -0.661
(2.36)  (2.05)  (3.07)  (2.22)  (3.03)
wood  or metal  work  -0.633  -0.679  -0.625  -0.620  -0.640
(3.24)  (3.44)  (3.03)  (3.23)  (3.23)
textiles  -0.547  -0.630  -0.907  -0.763  -0.991
(2.14)  (2.42)  (3.52)  (3.02)  (3.99)
Constant  1.514  1.756  2.415  1.861  2.432
(4.43)  (5.30)  (9.54)  (5.56)  (9.91)
R-squared:
between  0.40  0.33  0.26  0.32  0.23
overall  0.37  0.30  0.24  0.30  0.21
Wald  Chi-sq.  61.14  53.66  37.51  44.67  32.06
Rho**  0.88  0.89  0.90  0.89  0.90
Observations  296  296  296  296  296
Establishments  114  114  114  114  114
*Absolute  value  of  z-statistics  in parentheses
Fraction  of  variance  due  to establishment  effects
23Table  3: GLS Estimation  Result  of Equation  (2)*
Dependent  variable=  log of number  of full-time  employees.
Variables  Specification
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
log of number  of employees  at start-up  0.408  0.433  0.447  0.415  0.435
(4.67)  (4.97)  (4.78)  (4.91)  (4.90)
log of age of establishment  0.261  0.261  0.212  0.265  0.229
(3.86)  (3.85)  (3.05)  (3.93)  (3.36)
owns some  other establishment(s)  0.125  0.138  0.040  0.045  -0.007
(0.79)  (0.85)  (0.23)  (0.28)  (0.04)
Year  of observation:
1995  -0.157  -0.155  -0.143  -0.126  -0.118
(2.80)  (2.81)  (2.57)  (2.44)  (2.30)
1994  -0.152  -0.150  -0.146  -0.120  -0.118
(2.89)  (2.90)  (2.79)  (2.52)  (2.48)
Ethnic  group:
amhara  0.128  0.113  0.107  0.108
(0.97)  (0.83)  (0.81)  (0.80)
gurage  0.289  0.135  0.274  0.164
(1.63)  (0.74)  (1.53)  (0.91)
Education:
years of schooling  0.033  0.025  0.022
(1.89)  (1.50)  (1.32)
Had  formal  vocational  training  0.557  0.560  0.451
(3.11)  (3.08)  (2.50)
Prior  industry  experience:
Number  of years  0.011  0.010  0.002
(1.23)  (1.10)  (0.25)
worked  in a family  business  -0.431  -0.390  -0.233
(2.04)  (1.84)  (1.05)
worked  as an employee  0.221  0.261  0.215
(1.30)  (1.52)  (1.19)
was self-employed  0.125  0.124  0.121
(1.37)  (1.37)  (1.33)
Industry  group:
garment  or leather  goods  -0.435  -0.393  -0.601  -0.379  -0.544
(2.22)  (2.02)  (2.91)  (1.92)  (2.72)
wood or metal work  -0.523  -0.552  -0.508  -0.478  -0.495
(2.85)  (2.99)  (2.62)  (2.66)  (2.66)
textiles  -0.442  -0.495  -0.732  -0.581  -0.777
(1.87)  (2.08)  (3.06)  (2.52)  (3.39)
Constant  0.821  0.963  1.494  1.107  1.584
(2.39)  (2.86)  (5.01)  (3.30)  (5.67)
R-squared:
between  0.50  0.46  0.39  0.45  0.38
overall  0.46  0.42  0.36  0.42  0.35
Wald Chi-sq.  95.65  90.10  67.73  80.19 63.31
Rho**  0.85  0.86  0.88  0.87
Observations  296  296  296  296  296
Establishments  114  114  114  114  114
*Absolute  value  of z-statistics  in parentheses  24
- Fraction  of variance  due to establishment  effectsTable 4: GLS Estimation Result  of Equation  (5)*
Dependent  variable=  Average  annual  growth  rate  of  number  of  full-time  employees  since  start-up
Variable  Specification
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
log  of age  of establishment  -0.063  -0.062  -0.067  -0.057  -0.061
(5.11)  (4.95)  (5.49)  (4.73)  (5.16)
owns some  other  establishment(s)  0.038  0.039  0.031  0.028  0.023
(1.41)  (1.43)  (1.14)  (1.07)  (0.85)
Year  of observation:
1995  -0.030  -0.031  -0.029  -0.026  -0.026
(2.35)  (2.46)  (2.32)  (2.26)  (2.20)
1994  -0.027  -0.028  -0.027  -0.023  -0.023
(2.25)  (2.33)  (2.26)  (2.06)  (2.06)
Ethnic  group:
amhara  0.021  0.022  0.023  0.024
(0.86)  (0.86)  (0.96)  (0.97)
gurage  0.072  0.063  0.077  0.066
(2.33)  (2.09)  (2.51)  (2.21)
Education:
years  of schooling  0.002  0.000  0.003
(0.74)  (0.13)  (0.98)
Had  formal  vocational  training  0.053  0.053  0.041
(1.77)  (1.73)  (1.42)
Prior  industry  experience:
Number  of  years  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002
(0.93)  (1.02)  (1.41)
worked  in a family  business  -0.017  -0.013  -0.003
(0.49)  (0.38)  (0.09)
worked  as  an employee  0.063  0.069  0.059
(2.32)  (2.48)  (2.18)
was  self-employed  0.022  0.023  0.023
(1.10)  (1.14)  (1.12)
Industry  group:
garment  or leather  goods  -0.023  -0.012  -0.037  -0.014  -0.031
(0.68)  (0.34)  (1.13)  (0.45)  (0.99)
wood  or metal  work  0.022  0.012  0.024  0.025  0.023
(0.66)  (0.35)  (0.73)  (0.79)  (0.72)
textiles  -0.021  -0.037  -0.044  -0.024  -0.045
(0.53)  (0.92)  (1.17)  (0.64)  (1.26)
Constant  0.152  0.194  0.208  0.159  0.215
(2.74)  (3.64)  (5.24)  (3.01)  (5.51)
R-squared:
between  0.23  0.18  0.19  0.21  0.17
overall  0.23  0.18  0.20  0.21  0.17
Wald Chi-sq.  67.22  61.01  62.44  60.34  56.24
Rho**  0.74  0.75  0.75  0.73  0.74
Observations  296  296  296  296  296
Establishments  114  114  114  114  114
*Absolute  value  of  z-statistics  in parentheses
** Fraction  of variance  due  to establishment  effects
25Table 5: GLS Estimation  Result of Equation  (5)*
Dependent  variable=  Average  annual  growth  rate  of number  of full-time  employees  since  start-up
Variable  Specification
.(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
log  of  age  of establishment  -0.063  -0.062  -0.067  -0.057  -0.061
(5.11)  (4.95)  (5.49)  (4.73)  (5.16)
owns some  other  establishment(s)  0.038  0.039  0.031  0.028  0.023
(1.41)  (1.43)  (1.14)  (1.07)  (0.85)
Year  of  observation:
1995  -0.030  -0.031  -0.029  -0.026  -0.026
(2.35)  (2.46)  (2.32)  (2.26)  (2.20)
1994  -0.027  -0.028  -0.027  -0.023  -0.023
(2.25)  (2.33)  (2.26)  (2.06)  (2.06)
Ethnic  group:
amhara  0.021  0.022  0.023  0.024
(0.86)  (0.86)  (0.96)  (0.97)
gurage  0.072  0.063  0.077  0.066
(2.33)  (2.09)  (2.51)  (2.21)
Education:
years  of schooling  0.002  0.000  0.003
(0.74)  (0.13)  (0.98)
Had  formal  vocational  training  0.053  0.053  0.041
(1.77)  (1.73)  (1.42)
Prior  industry  experience:
Number  of years  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002
(0.93)  (1.02)  (1.41)
worked  in a family  business  -0.017  -0.013  -0.003
(0.49)  (0.38)  (0.09)
worked  as  an employee  0.063  0.069  0.059
(2.32)  (2.48)  (2.18)
was  self-employed  0.022  0.023  0.023
(1.10)  (1.14)  (1.12)
Industry  group:
garment  or leather  goods  -0.023  -0.012  -0.037  -0.014  -0.031
(0.68)  (0.34)  (1.13)  (0.45)  (0.99)
wood  or metal  work  0.022  0.012  0.024  0.025  0.023
(0.66)  (0.35)  (0.73)  (0.79)  (0.72)
textiles  -0.021  -0.037  -0.044  -0.024  -0.045
(0.53)  (0.92)  (1.17)  (0.64)  (1.26)
Constant  0.152  0.194  0.208  0.159  0.215
(2.74)  (3.64)  (5.24)  (3.01)  (5.51)
R-squared:
between  0.23  0.18  0.19  0.21  0.17
overall  0.23  0.18  0.20  0.21  0.17
Wald  Chi-sq.  67.22  61.01  62.44  60.34  56.24
Rho**  0.74  0.75  0.75  0.73  0.74
Observations  296  296  296  296  296
Establishments  114  114  114  114  114
*Absolute  value  of z-statistics  in parentheses
** Fraction  of  variance  due  to establishment  effectsPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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